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REFOCUSING COMMONALITY: AN
ECONOMIC APPROACH THAT SHARES
SOMETHING IN COMMON WITH HOWEY
I. INTRODUCTION
It is the week before Mother’s Day and while Lucas is filling up his
coffee cup in the break room pondering whether he will get his mother
anything this year, he overhears a co-worker excitedly talking about
these new flowers the co-worker ordered for his mother.1 The new
flower goes by the name Zibby Star Gazers, and a dozen currently retail
for fifty dollars, notwithstanding ancillary filler foliage.2 Turns out, all
the starlets in Hollywood have been spotted adorning them on the red
carpet this season, including Lucas’s mother’s favorite actress.
Interested, Lucas conducts a Google search, bypassing any
Wikipedia related information, and finds a credible news source that
discusses the Zibby Star Gazers as the hot new flower destined to
overtake the Rose for flower supremacy in a woman’s heart. With this
information, Lucas phones the nearest floral shop and orders a dozen
Zibby Star Gazers. To his surprise, the florist informs Lucas that they
have been sold out for weeks and recommends a dozen long stemmed
roses for ten dollars because the demand for roses has plummeted. After
calling several more florists, Lucas settles for the roses.
Several weeks later, Lucas overhears the very same co-worker
speaking about a farm in California he invested in that provides him
profits from the growth and subsequent sale of Zibby Star Gazer bulbs.3
Considering how much money he lost in the recent recession, Lucas
decides to contact the company, Triple S. Bulbs. The company sends him
brochures and directs him to its website, where Lucas learns the flower,
This hypothetical is loosely based on true events. See generally MIKE DASH,
TULIPOMANIA 1 (1999) (detailing the events that lead to the Dutch financial bubble of 1637
involving tulip bulbs). Tulips became increasingly popular during 1621 amongst Dutch
society’s elite. Id. at 175. As a result, prices for individual tulip bulbs and bulbs by the
pound skyrocketed before crashing in February of 1635. Id. at 106–29. After February of
1635, the aggregate market value of tulip bulbs dropped to a value approximately 1–5% of
the original aggregate. Id. at 166. Compare this with America’s greatest financial collapse,
the Great Depression, which saw an aggregate market value crash that resulted in a
remaining value of twenty percent of the original value. Id.
2
As demand for tulip bulbs increased, prices of tulip bulbs gradually rose to the point
that families were exchanging their houses and farmland for a handful of tulip bulbs. Id. at
106–07. At the height of the tulip boom, the price paid for one pound of average quality
tulip bulbs equaled an average working man’s yearly salary. Id. at 157.
3
Such a scheme, where the investor “purchases” a lot of uncultivated land or crops and
the promoter cultivates and distributes the crops, was the basis for the decision in SEC v.
W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 294–96 (1946).
1
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praised as the most beautiful flower made by Mother Nature, was
recently discovered by a botanist off the coast of Bora Bora. With the
little research Lucas gathered, he decides to attempt to recoup his recent
investment losses by buying into the flower bulb market. Lucas sends
three thousand dollars to Triple S. Bulbs, and in return, receives his
packet of ownership information detailing the transaction.4 In exchange
for his investment, Lucas now owns rights to receive profits from the
cultivation and distribution of bulbs farmed on a small parcel of land he
“purchased.” Triple S. Bulbs will handle aspects of the business and
Lucas’s profits will be derived solely from his parcel.
Unfortunately, the information about the botanist discovering the
Zibby Star Gazer is misleading. A national news syndicate runs a story
about how Zibby Star Gazers are really man-made in laboratories that
test chemicals on animals. As a result, the Screen Actors Guild issues a
statement requiring all members of Hollywood’s elite to cease their love
affair with Zibby Star Gazers immediately. Within hours, demand for
the once cherished flower wilts away. Lucas’s investment is now
worthless.
Although this story may seem far-fetched, outlandish investment
schemes have existed for centuries.5 Moreover, the number of new
predatory investment schemes tends to increase after times of war and
economic hardship.6 To combat these fraudulent practices, Congress
created a federal system that mandates disclosure and regulates the
exchange of securities.7 Although the law was designed to be broad in
its authority, courts have struggled to define what precisely constitutes a
security as it relates to nontraditional investment schemes.8

Typical investment schemes tempt investors with a small requisite investment price
and easy access to the scheme. See DASH, supra note 1, at 112 (discussing how the tulip bulb
schemes of the 1630s required little money, in relation to other investment schemes of the
time, and access to such schemes was relatively easy for novice investors). For interested
persons, one need only visit the local floral nursery to purchase tulip bulbs as many new
nurseries opened to accommodate the demand. Id.
5
1 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 5 (3d ed. 1989) [hereinafter
LOSS & SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION] (quoting STEPHEN KILLIK, THE WORK OF THE
STOCK EXCHANGE 12 (2d ed. 1934)). In the late seventeenth century, thousands of people
invested in companies for which they had no idea what type of business the company
conducted. Id.
6
See K. FRED SKOUSEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SEC 3 (4th ed. 1987) (discussing the
optimism of investors after WWI and WWII and how new investment schemes were
regularly introduced).
7
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2006).
8
See infra Part II.C (discussing the cases that started securities law jurisprudence).
4
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Under relevant jurisprudence, a nontraditional investment scheme is
classified as a security if it qualifies as an “investment contract.”9
However, investment contract analysis often turns on whether the
investment scheme in question qualifies as a “common enterprise” under
the applicable commonality test.10 Since 1964, courts have disagreed on
the appropriate definition of a common enterprise and have created
competing tests.11 To date, the U.S. Supreme Court has declined to
resolve the issue of defining “commonality.”12 Although recent trends
suggest courts are acquiescing to the inconsistencies surrounding the
existence of multiple tests, the legal field will likely relive the confusion
surrounding the current commonality tests given society’s passion for
taking greater risks after times of economic hardship.13
This Note chronicles the circumstances that gave rise to the
conflicting commonality tests and presents a solution that is rigid
enough to provide guidance, but also workable enough to be utilized in
an ever changing financial environment. Part II looks at the historical
repetition of financial collapses, subsequent government regulation, and
commonality jurisprudence.14 In Part III, this Note analyzes the three
different commonality tests and their respective strengths and
weaknesses.15 Next, Part IV proposes a return to the original intent of

See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 297–302 (1946) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (creating the landmark test for what is considered an investment contract); see also
infra Part II.D (discussing this test in detail).
10
Howey, 328 U.S. at 301.
11
See infra Part II.E (outlining the three tests that circuits have devised to analyze and
define commonality); see also infra Part II.F (summarizing each circuit’s preferred
commonality test).
12
See Mordaunt v. Incomco, 469 U.S. 1115, 1115 (1985), denying cert. to 686 F.2d 815 (9th
Cir. 1982). Although the majority did not voice its reasoning for denying certiorari, Justice
White dissented and highlighted contradictory holdings from various circuits to argue that
the Supreme Court should have resolved the circuit split. Id. at 1116–17 (White, J.,
dissenting); see also SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 391 (2004) (analyzing whether an
investment scheme promising a fixed rate of return can qualify as an investment contract
under the Howey test without discussing, in depth, the commonality element).
13
See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF
FINANCIAL CRISES 85 (4th ed. 2000) (noting that America’s prosperous times of the late
1990s produced many subsequent “scams, swindles, frauds, or actions of bad judgment”).
The author provides historical examples of investors taking greater chances during times of
over inflated markets followed by the subsequent economic recovery period. Id. at 223–32;
see also GEORGE COOPER, THE ORIGIN OF FINANCIAL CRISES 151 (Vintage Books 2008) (noting
the economic phenomenon that occurs when industry creates a limited number of risk
products available to investors, which inadvertently encourages investors to seek excessive
risk-taking).
14
See infra Part II (providing a historical perspective as a foundation for analyzing the
three commonality tests).
15
See infra Part III (examining the strengths and weaknesses of each commonality test).
9
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Howey by abandoning the current tests’ fundamental focus and applying
an economic-based standard.16 Finally, Part V of this Note applies the
proposed standard to the hypothetical presented above in the hope that
Lucas will be able to recover his failed investment.17
II. BACKGROUND
Prior to 1933, American financial markets were regulated on a stateby-state basis.18 Spurred by the Great Depression, Congress passed
legislation to regulate the financial markets at the federal level after
learning just how powerful and widespread the depression’s effects were
on the nation.19 Even after legislation defined which investment schemes
and markets were regulated, questions arose regarding whether certain
nontraditional investment schemes were covered.20 The U.S. Supreme
Court created a four-pronged test to handle non-traditional investment
schemes, but the commonality requirement within that test only served
to further confuse participants in the financial markets and the courts
that adjudicated their grievances.21 To better understand the current
state of commonality jurisprudence, it is helpful to examine the historical
events that led to the need for federal regulation.
A. Historical Synopsis of Economic Conditions Demanding Regulation
There exists a general misconception that securities regulation in the
United States began with the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”).22 In
fact, dating as far back as 1285, King Edward I laid the foundation for
See infra Part IV (promoting an economic-based commonality test).
See infra Part V (attempting to vindicate, if appropriate, the character in the
introductory hypothetical).
18
See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 11–12
(5th ed. 2004) [hereinafter LOSS & SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS] (acknowledging that before
the enactment of the 1933 Act, securities were governed by individual state legislatures).
19
See infra Part II.B (outlining Congress’s first attempt to regulate securities on a federal
level).
20
See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946) (noting that the 1933 Act and any
relevant legislative history do not provide a definition for “the term ‘investment
contract’”).
21
See id. at 298–99 (declaring that “an investment contract for purposes of the Securities
Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a
common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a
third party”); see also Part II.D (compartmentalizing the Howey test into four elements).
22
See SKOUSEN, supra note 6, at 3 (specifying that rather than being the starting point for
securities regulation in the United States, the financial collapse of 1929 coupled with the
hardships endured in the 1930s acted more like the tipping point in a long line of financial
disarray). Thus, the financial collapse was more of a catalyst, which solidified the need for
regulation more so than the original ingredient. Id.
16
17
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modern day securities laws when he attempted to control failing
financial markets by requiring licenses for brokers located in London.23
Thereafter, in 1696, Parliament not only required licensing for brokers,
but also mandated the first recording system for financial market
transactions in England.24 It was not until 1720 that England passed its
first comprehensive piece of securities legislation.25 The legislation was
enacted in response to “The South Sea Bubble,” which, like modern day
financial market bubbles, was caused by an inflated market value with a
deficiency in valuable underlying assets to match the valuation.26
American securities regulation began to take shape during the
Nineteenth Century when Congress grew concerned about the need to
issue federal licenses to companies that operated in interstate
commerce.27 In 1902, the Industrial Commission suggested to Congress
that there was a pressing need for uniform regulation with respect to
securities; however, Congress ignored the recommendations.28
Meanwhile, state governments took it upon themselves to protect the
citizens of their sovereigns by enacting what later became known as
23
See id. at 2 (quoting STEPHEN KILLIK, THE WORK OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE 12 (2d ed.
1934)).
24
See id. at 3–4 (describing how Parliament passed a statute penalizing unlicensed
trading, required a recording system for every transaction, and set a limit on commissions
at one half of one percent). Parliament was compelled to enact the statute because it felt
that the privileges given to investment promoters were being abused for profit at the
expense of “ignorant [m]en, drawn in by the Reputation, falsely raised and artfully spread
concerning the thriving [s]tate of their [s]tock.” Id. (quoting 11 PARL. HIST. ENG. 595
(1696)).
25
See id. at 2. After several years of relaxed regulatory oversight of England’s financial
markets, the country experienced a bursting bubble market effect and passed what has
become known as the Bubble Act of 1720. Id.
26
See id. at 4 (summarizing the story of The South Sea Bubble, which occurred when the
British Government granted a trading monopoly to both the Mississippi Company and the
South Sea Company). The two companies had exclusive rights to the trading, which
occurred between South America and the British. Id. With the monopoly in hand and
apparently feeling generous, leaders of the two companies attempted to pay off the public
debt of both France and England. Id. However, the economy fell under financial stress
throughout Europe causing the value of the two shipping companies to sink. Id. From July
of 1720 to December of that same year, the value of the South Sea Company fell from over
£1,000 to just £125. See generally MALCOLM BALEN, THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE SOUTH SEA
BUBBLE: THE WORLD’S FIRST GREAT FINANCIAL SCANDAL 1 (2003) (taking an in-depth look
behind the story summarized by Professor Loss).
27
SKOUSEN, supra note 6, at 3.
28
See id. (suggesting that the financial climate was not right for a change and that
Congress was not inclined to act until it was forced to by a serious financial plight). The
Commission suggested mandatory disclosure rules and annual financial reports. Id.
During the two decades after the Industrial Commission’s findings, three separate bills
were introduced to Congress to implement the suggestions. Id. None of these bills made it
to the House or Senate. Id.
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“blue sky” laws.29 In 1911, Kansas instituted the first of these laws and
within two years, twenty-two other states passed similar laws designed
to regulate the sale of securities.30 With many states passing their own
versions of securities regulations, the world of securities transactions
was inconsistent from one state to another.31 Unfortunately, the
inadequacy of blue sky state laws and their inability to curb fraudulent
investment practices contributed to the Great Depression, and
ultimately, the need for federal regulation of securities.32
B. The 1933 Act
“[T]he Roaring Twenties” is a catchy phrase that has been used to
describe a time in American history when the post-war economy grew
fast and society’s appetite for money grew even faster.33 To fuel this
See WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND
CORPORATIONS 404 (7th ed. 2009) (suggesting the name “‘blue sky’” came “from the claim
that such [state laws] protect[ed] investors from ‘speculative schemes which have no more
basis than so many feet of “blue sky”’” (quoting Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550
(1917))). But see LOSS & SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 18, at 9–10 (offering the idea
that the name “blue sky” came from the notion that “promoters . . . ‘would sell building
lots in the blue sky in fee simple’” (quoting Thomas Mulvey, Blue Sky Law, 36 CAN. L. TIMES
37 (1916))); Nathan W. Drage, Are Limited Partnership Interests Securities? A Different
Conclusion Under the California Limited Partnership Act, 18 PAC. L.J. 125, 129 (1986)
(suggesting the name “‘blue sky’” actually came from state laws that were designed to
protect farmers in Kansas from being sold their very own piece of the great blue sky).
30
SKOUSEN, supra note 6, at 3; see KLEIN ET AL., supra note 29, at 404 (noting that state blue
sky laws were limited in their jurisdiction to the state border). The author also points out
that many of the states that implemented “blue sky law[s]” actually had limited resources
to enforce them. Id. at 404. Also, presumably to attract business, states often included
special interest exemptions. Id.
31
See LOSS & SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 18, at 11–12 (noting the diversity
amongst state securities laws before unification was introduced).
32
Philip A. Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisors Act of
1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 214, 216–17 (1959).
33
See Richard B. Freeman, Reforming the United States’ Economic Model After the Failure of
Unfettered Financial Capitalism, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 685, 704 (2010) (using “[R]oaring
[T]wenties” when describing the parallels between the behavior exhibited today by high
level executives and other participants in securities markets as compared to the 1920s);
Brent J. Horton, In Defense of Private-Label Mortgage-Backed Securities, 61 FLA. L. REV. 827, 849
(2009) (identifying the 1920s as “the Roaring Twenties” while describing the period as a
time when the general investor was not content with simply doubling his or her money).
See generally Christine Sgarlata Chung, From Lily Bart to the Boom-Boom Room: How Wall
Street’s Social and Cultural Response to Women Has Shaped Securities Regulation, 33 HARV. J.L.
& GENDER 175, 198–99 (2010) (utilizing the classic phrase “Roaring Twenties” when
discussing the effect of gender bias in the field of securities); Daniel J. Morrissey, The
Securities Act at its Diamond Jubilee: Renewing the Case for a Robust Registration Requirement,
11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 749, 755 (2009) (referencing the 1920s as “the [R]oaring [T]wenties” and
as the decade when the stock market rose steadily while cries for federal securities
regulation went unheeded).
29
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demand, more than fifty billion dollars worth of new securities were
introduced in the United States.34 To capitalize on this increase,
investment promoters devised techniques to profit from the abuse of the
free market system.35 Several common abusive techniques included
wash sales, issuing false and misleading financial statements, excessively
buying “on margin,” and the misuse of inside information by corporate
officers.36 All of these practices positioned the promoter or corporate
officer to take advantage of the volatile stock price created by his own
malfeasance by purchasing low and selling high before the price fell back
down.37
As it turns out, over half of the fifty billion dollars worth of new
securities proved to be worthless.38 Before the depression, the aggregate
worth of all securities listed on the national exchange markets equaled
eighty-nine billion dollars.39 After the stock market crash, the aggregate
value of stock in the country fell to fifteen billion dollars.40 Seeking
solutions to compliment Roosevelt’s New Deal, Congress investigated
the reasons behind the catastrophic failure of the stock market and
discovered that the lack of oversight in the securities markets directly
caused the depression.41
The solution Congress crafted came in the form of a federal system
capable of tracking securities, and it implemented requirements
designed to curb the kinds of fraudulent practices that ruined the
national economy in the previous decade. On May 27, 1933, Congress
passed the 1933 Act.42 The main purpose of the 1933 Act was to protect

H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2 (1933).
Cf. SEC, 25TH ANNUAL REPORT XV–XVII (1959) (providing valuable information
regarding the need for and subsequent organization of the SEC).
36
See SKOUSEN, supra note 6, at 4 (discussing various types of abusive techniques). Wash
sales occurred when investors would successively buy and then sell the same security
repeatedly to create a false demand, and thus drive the price up. Id. One is said to buy “on
margin” when they finance their speculative investment with excessive credit as opposed
to the typical cash or cash equivalent. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
37
Id. at 4.
38
H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2.
39
See SKOUSEN, supra note 6, at 5 (discussing the beginning of the market collapse in the
fall of 1929).
40
See id. (detailing the rise and fall of the aggregate value of stock in the United States).
In the fall of 1929 alone, the market fell $18,000,000,000. Id. After a short false recovery, the
market then declined over the course of two and a half years until 1932. Id. The total
amount of the collapse was a staggering $74,000,000,000, eighty-seven percent % of the
aggregate market value before the collapse. Id.
41
See Loomis, supra note 32, at 216–17 (discussing Congress’s investigation behind the
cause of the Great Depression).
42
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2006).
34
35
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the market and investors from fraudulent practices by requiring the full
disclosure of all material relevant information.43
The immediate effect of the 1933 Act was felt by all persons who
dealt in the securities industry. The 1933 Act requires all investment
products that do not qualify for exempt status to be registered before
such products can be sold to investors.44 To further Congress’s aim of
providing investors with adequate information to aid their potential
decisions, promoters must provide an accurate prospectus free of
misrepresentations prior to the sale of a new investment product.45
However, both the legal and business communities still struggled to
determine if unique, less traditional investment schemes fell within the
scope of the 1933 Act.
C. Defining a Security
The 1933 Act defines “security” by enumerating traditional products,
such as stocks and bonds, as well as including several nontraditional
products like “investment contracts.”46 The subsequent enactment of the
43
Id. § 77e–j; Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 1 (1933).
Stating:
The aim is to prevent further exploitation of the public by the sale of
unsound,
fraudulent,
and
worthless
securities
through
misrepresentation; to place adequate and true information before the
investor; to protect honest enterprise, seeking capital by honest
presentation, against the competition afforded by dishonest securities
offered to the public through crooked promotion . . . .
Id.; see also SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (recognizing that exemptions
such as the private offering exemption apply to investors who are in need of protection and
not to investors who have access to information); Van Dyke v. Coburn Enters., Inc., 873
F.2d 1094, 1098 (8th Cir. 1989) (explaining that the private offering exemption allows a
promoter to avoid the 1933 Act’s registration and disclosure regulations if he is dealing in
close relationship with his investors); Doran v. Petrol. Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 903 (5th
Cir. 1977) (holding that the private offering exemption applies if an investor has a close
relationship with the promoter—employment, family, superior bargaining power).
44
See 15 U.S.C. § 77c (outlining the requirements that must be met before a financial
transaction can be classified as exempt); id. § 77e (requiring registration before the sale of a
security); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (stating the 1933 and 1934
Acts “protect investors against fraud”); SEC v. Harwyn Indus. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 943, 953
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (“[T]he spirit and purpose of . . . the 1933 Act . . . is ‘to protect investors by
promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment
decisions.’” (quoting Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 124)); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co.,
283 F. Supp. 417, 428 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (explaining that the 1934 Act protects investors). But
see Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982) (explaining that the antifraud
protections are not unlimited).
45
15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77j, 77q.
46
Id. § 77b(a)(1). The 1933 Act’s definition for “security”:
The term “security” means any note, stock, treasury stock, security
future, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of
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Securities Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”) also uses the phrase “investment
contract” when defining “security”; however, because slightly different
terms are used, some confusion arose as to which definition should be
applied.47 For the sake of clarity, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the
subtle difference and held that the phrase “security” within each statute
was, in effect, the same.48
It is commonly understood that investment products explicitly listed
in the 1933 Act generally fall within the ambit of the 1933 Act.49
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateraltrust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable
share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit
for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral
rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security,
certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any
interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities
exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or
instrument commonly known as a “security”, or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt
for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any
of the foregoing.
Id.
47

Id. § 78c(a)(10). The 1934 Act’s definition of “security”:
The term “security” means any note, stock, treasury stock, security
future, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any
profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or
lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, any put, call, straddle,
option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or
index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value
thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on
a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or in
general, any instrument commonly known as a “security”; or any
certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any
note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a
maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months,
exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of
which is likewise limited.

Id.
48
See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335–36 (1967) (finding that the definition of
“security” found in the 1933 Act is “virtually identical” to the definition found in the 1934
Act).
49
See SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350 (1943). The Court recognized
that Congress had not created a definition generally applicable to a wide range of
investment schemes. Id. Rather, Congress simply enumerated known investment schemes
they wished to be covered by the Acts. Id. Most of the investment schemes listed in the
definition were “pretty much standardized and the name alone carries well settled
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Congress solidified this concept by including the phrase “or
instrument[s] commonly known as a ‘security.’”50 Therefore, it is
understood that traditional investment products, which automatically
qualify as securities, need no definition because their characteristics are
self-evident.51 However, Congress failed to provide any definition for
“[t]he term ‘investment contract.’”52
D. The Landmark Howey Test
It quickly became apparent in cases involving nontraditional
investment schemes that there was a need to define an investment
contract. Noting the Congressional intent behind the 1933 Act, courts
subsequently interpreted investment contracts as a catch-all phrase
designed to bring within its authority more types of creative investment
schemes, as opposed to limiting the phrase’s reach.53 Although the
Court had several opportunities to define what constitutes an investment
contract, it was not until the Court’s holding in SEC v. Howey that the
business and legal communities received concrete direction.54
The case before the Howey Court concerned a company that sold
small plots of land that, when harvested, yielded citrus fruits for
In addition to the simple real estate transaction,
distribution.55

meaning. Others are of more variable character and were necessarily designated by more
descriptive terms, such as . . . ‘investment contract’ . . . .” Id. at 351; see also 14 WILLIAM
MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 6833 (Rev. vol.
2012) (acknowledging that the specific types of securities listed in the 1933 Act are wellsettled as being common, while on the other hand, untraditional financial instruments and
business schemes are uncommon and fall under investment contract).
50
15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1).
51
See FLETCHER, supra note 49, § 6833 (recognizing that Congress did not need to
elaborate on certain types of securities).
52
See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(noting the void in the legislative record regarding a definition for “investment contract”).
53
See Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1144 (2d Cir. 1982) (recognizing that Congress
included catch-all phrases in the definition of a security to cover financial instruments and
business schemes not easily classified within traditional categories of securities); see also
H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 11 (1933) (noting the definition of security is broad enough to bring
various investments within the traditional scope of a security); Bradley D. Johnson, Note,
Discretionary Commodity Accounts as Securities: An Application of the Howey Test, 53
FORDHAM L. REV. 639, 643 (1984) (discussing how the Howey test’s flexible approach is in
synch with Congressional intent to make investment contracts a catch-all phrase).
54
See Howey, 328 U.S. at 298–99 (proclaiming the first definition for an investment
contract as a “scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is
led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party”).
55
See id. at 295–96 (explaining the business structure involved in the case). The
promoter, W.J. Howey, consisted of two separate corporations. Id. W.J. Howey and
Company owned the real estate on which the citrus groves were planted, while Howey-in-
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purchasers also entered into a contract, which gave the company full
discretion and authority over the harvesting, marketing, and the
subsequent sale of yielded citrus fruits.56 The deal entitled the purchaser
to a portion of the entire enterprise’s net profits in exchange for
monetary investment in the company’s citrus business.57 Given the
unique business model, the Court analyzed the facts to determine if it
could be considered an investment contract, and therefore, a security
subject to the regulations of the 1933 Act.58
The Court began its analysis by acknowledging that Congress had
provided little guidance in its legislative history as to what it meant by
the phrase investment contract.59 However, the Court identified existing
blue sky laws, which had incorporated the phrase “investment contract”
into their securities analysis.60 Therefore, Congress merely solidified the
phrase in the 1933 Act, and the Court could use state law precedent to
derive the meaning of investment contracts.61 As a result, the Court
articulated a four-pronged test for determining an investment contract:
(1) an investment of money; (2) into a common enterprise; (3) with the
expectation of profiting; (4) solely from the efforts of the enterprise’s
promoter or a third party.62 The Court then applied this newfound test

the-Hills Service engaged in cultivating the citrus groves and marketing the crops. Id. On
a yearly basis, approximately five hundred acres of citrus groves were planted. Id.
56
See id. at 295–97 (noting that it was the company’s practice to lure vacationers from the
adjacent resort, which the company also owned, to sell the out-of-state residents on the
idea of investing in an effortless investment).
57
See id. at 295–96 (noting the company annually planted 250 acres of citrus for its own
use and sold the remaining 250 acres to the public to finance additional development).
Investors could expect a ten percent annual return over a ten year period. Id. “[I]ndividual
development of the plots of land that . . . would seldom be economically feasible due to
their small size.” Id. at 300. This is an example of economies of scale. See RONALD C.
FISHER, STATE & LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCE 121–22 (3rd ed. 2007) (defining economies of scale
as “a decrease in average cost as the quantity of output rises” allowing “individual
consumers can reduce their costs by sharing the good and its total cost with others”); Jack
Alan Kramer, Vouching for Federal Educational Choice: If You Pay Them, They Will Come, 29
VAL. U. L. REV. 1005, 1015 (1995) (“Economies of scale occur when the average total cost of
producing a good or service declines as output expands.”).
58
Howey, 328 U.S. at 297.
59
Id. at 298. The Court stated “[t]he term ‘investment contract’ is undefined by the
Securities Act or by relevant legislative reports.” Id.
60
Id.; see State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 177 N.W. 937, 938 (Minn. 1920) (holding
that an investment contract was “[t]he placing of capital or laying out of money in a way
intended to secure income or profit from its employment”).
61
Howey, 328 U.S. at 298. The Court noted that the term investment contract had been
steadfastly used judicially before the enactment of the 1933 Act; therefore, it can be
reasonably inferred that the same meaning state courts used was the meaning Congress
intended to adopt when codifying the phrase. Id.
62
Id. at 301.
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to hold that the unique business model at bar was indeed a security.63
Although the test was intended to answer the question “what is an
investment contract,” it actually added to the confusion by not
specifying the requirements for a common enterprise.64
E. Subsequent Creation of the Commonality Tests
The common enterprise element of the Howey test has begotten three
subtests, which appear minutely different; yet, the differences can have
dramatic effects when analyzing an investment product to determine if it
is a security.65 Compared to the other three elements of Howey, the
divide among the circuits as to how the common enterprise element
should be interpreted is understandable given the nature of the words
used.66 There is little dispute when attempting to interpret investment of
money, expectation of profits, or efforts of others.67 However, the notion
of a common enterprise, within the landscape of securities, has led
circuits to disagree on whether the focus is between the investors
themselves or between investors and the promoters.68 Furthermore, is it

Id. at 300.
See id. at 297, 298 (recognizing that Congress did not provide a definition for
“investment contract” and that the Court would need to create a test to decide whether the
investment scheme at bar was a security under the 1933 Act).
65
See infra Part II.E.1–3 (stating that when analyzing commonality, it is important to
recognize the subtle change in the use of the word “fortunes”). With horizontal
commonality, the key issue focuses on whether the fortunes of each investor rise and fall
with the fortunes of all other investors. Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 19 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 1994).
Unlike horizontal commonality, vertical commonality shifts this question to whether the
fortunes of each investor correlate with either the efforts or fortunes of the promoter. Brodt v.
Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Kosot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473
(5th Cir. 1974). Thus, for broad vertical commonality, the fortunes of the investor must be
tied to the efforts of the promoter. See Brodt, 595 F.2d at 461 (holding no commonality
existed because strong efforts by the promoter does not necessarily equate to success for
the investor). But for strict vertical commonality, the focus turns on the fortunes of the
investor as it relates to the fortunes of the promoter, instead of the efforts. See Kosot
Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d at 478 (focusing on the impact of the promoter’s efforts rather
than the effort itself). For clarity, horizontal is investor fortunes/investor fortunes; broad
vertical is investor fortunes/promoter efforts; and strict vertical is investor
fortunes/promoter fortunes. Infra Part II.E.
66
See supra note 65 (outlining the overlapping language used in the commonality test in
an attempt to clarify the inherent confusion).
67
See FLETCHER, supra note 49, § 6833 (recognizing that Congress did not need to
elaborate on certain types of securities).
68
See SEC v. Cont’l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d. 516, 521–22 (5th Cir. 1974)
(disagreeing with the court in Milnarik and holding that commonality turns on the degree
of reliance an investor places on the promoter); Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457
F.2d 274, 279 (7th Cir. 1972) (focusing on the relationship between the investors themselves
by holding that “[w]e do not believe an investor who grants discretionary authority to his
63
64
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necessary to have more than one investor involved in order for
commonality to exist?69 When taking the broad scope of the 1933 Act
into account, one may also question what degree of relationship between
the promoter and investor begins to offend even the broad reading of the
1933 Act.70 The Court bypassed several opportunities to answer these
inquires raised by the inherent conflict within the phrase “common
enterprise” and left it to the circuit courts to work out the proper test.71
To date, the courts have articulated three different tests: horizontal
commonality; broad vertical commonality; and narrow vertical
commonality.
1.

Horizontal Commonality

Horizontal commonality exists when the success of each individual
investor in an enterprise is tied to the success of every other individual
investor.72 Typically, the fortunes of each investor fluctuate in harmony
with every investor who contributes money to the same enterprise.73
Horizontal commonality is defined as the pooling or pro-rata

broker thereby joins the broker’s other customers in the kind of common enterprise that
would convert the agency relationship into a statutory security”).
69
See James D. Gordon III, Defining a Common Enterprise in Investment Contracts, 72 OHIO
ST. L.J. 59, 66–67 (2011) (distinguishing horizontal commonality which “focuses on the
horizontal relationship among investors” from the types of vertical commonality, which
“focus[] on the vertical relationship between the investor and the promoter”); Maura K.
Monaghan, Note, An Uncommon State of Confusion: The Common Enterprise Element of
Investment Contract Analysis, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 2135, 2156 (1995) (arguing that the
horizontal commonality test is very restrictive because it limits securities to those involving
more than one investor at the expense of ignoring “parallel frauds,” which occurs when a
promoter is conducting his business in a fraudulent manner with respect to each individual
investor); see also Marc G. Alcser, Comment, The Howey Test: A Common Ground for the
Common Enterprise Theory, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1217, 1233–34 (1996) (discussing the
heightened need for disclosure in situations involving only one investor).
70
Milnarik, 457 F.2d at 275–76. The court in Milnarik adamantly rejected the plaintiff’s
position that the words in the 1933 Act should be read literally as to include the scheme in
which the plaintiff had invested. Id. Instead, the court retorted “we do not believe every
conceivable arrangement that would fit a dictionary definition of an investment contract
was intended to be included within the statutory definition of a security.” Id.
71
See supra note 12 (discussing the reasons behind the Court’s decisions to pass upon the
opportunity to resolve the circuit split regarding commonality). Most notably, the Court
denied certiorari to a case posing the specific question of commonality. Mordaunt v.
Incomco, 469 U.S. 1115, 1115 (1985), denying cert. to 686 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1982).
72
Milnarik, 457 F.2d at 276.
73
See Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 87–88 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that
horizontal commonality did not exist in a scheme involving condominium properties
because the success of each condominium unit investment, which was owned separately,
did not fluctuate in harmony with the success of other condominium units investments
within the same property).
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distribution of income derived from the operation of the enterprise, or
the pooling or pro-rata sharing of expenses when purchasing or
constructing an asset.74 Generally speaking, horizontal commonality can
be shown when the success of the individual’s investment is tied to the
success of the enterprise as a whole.75 By its very nature, horizontal
commonality requires more than one investor be involved for a common
enterprise to exist.76
In its landmark opinion, Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals elevated the pooling of investor’s interests
requirement to the level of primary guidepost when it solidified its
adherence to the horizontal commonality test.77 The investment scheme
in Milnarik consisted of individuals that deposited money with a
common broker, who in turn, used its own discretion to invest the
deposited funds in various futures commodities.78 Each depositor had
74
See id. at 87 (noting that the pooling of assets is usually combined with the pro-rata
distribution of profits to show horizontal commonality).
75
Milnarik, 457 F.2d at 276–77.
76
See Curran v. Merrill Lynch, 622 F.2d 216, 222–23 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding no
horizontal commonality existed because the agreement was solely between one investor
and one promoter as opposed to multiple investors).
77
Milnarik, 457 F.2d at 276–77. The Seventh Circuit later affirmed its stance on
horizontal commonality when it expressly stated, “[t]his [c]ircuit has strictly adhered to a
‘horizontal’ test of common enterprise, under which multiple investors must pool their
investments and receive pro rata profits.” Stenger v. R.H. Love Galleries, Inc., 741 F.2d 144,
146 (7th Cir. 1984). The court found no horizontal commonality existed when an investor
purchased valuable paintings from an art gallery with an attached agreement that
obligated the gallery to purchase the artwork back within five years. Id. at 146–47. The
court reasoned that the agreement contained neither pooling of funds nor pro rata sharing
of profits. Id. Interestingly, the plaintiff argued in the alternative that the court should
adopt vertical commonality instead of horizontal commonality. Id. The court turned down
the invitation but still exercised the vertical commonality test to reiterate to plaintiff that he
had no case. Id. It is apparent from the opinion that the court was just as interested in
admonishing the plaintiff for bringing a nearly baseless claim as they were in reaffirming
their unwavering devotion to horizontal commonality analysis. Id.
78
Milnarik, 457 F.2d at 275; see Curran, 622 F.2d at 220 (defining a commodity future as
“a standardized contract for the purchase and sale of a fixed quantity of a commodity to be
delivered in a specified future month at a price agreed upon when the contract is entered
into”); see also 7 U.S.C. § 1a(4) (2006), for the definition of “commodity”:
The term “commodity” means wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley,
rye, flaxseed, grain sorghums, mill feeds, butter, eggs, Solanum
tuberosum (Irish potatoes), wool, wool tops, fats and oils (including
lard, tallow, cottonseed oil, peanut oil, soybean oil, and all other fats
and oils), cottonseed meal, cottonseed, peanuts, soybeans, soybean
meal, livestock, livestock products, and frozen concentrated orange
juice, and all other goods and articles, except onions as provided in
section 13-1 of this title, and all services, rights, and interests in which
contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.
Id.
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an individual contract with the common broker and was entitled to
receive profits derived from their funds alone.79 In exchange, the broker
retained a commission from any profits manufactured via the
speculative trading.80 Citing previous Seventh Circuit precedent, the
Milnarik court held that this type of investment scheme was not an
investment contract under the 1933 Act because the success and failure
of each investor did not impact the success of other investors who also
had agreements with the common broker.81
Following the Seventh Circuit’s lead in Milnarik, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals accepted the horizontal commonality test when it faced
a similar fact pattern involving futures commodities.82 In Curran v.
Merrill Lynch, the court also focused on the pooling of investor’s interests
while at the same time expressly denouncing the vertical commonality
test.83 The court recognized that situations can arise where the
underlying product involved, in this case futures commodities, may not
be securities, but the overarching investment scheme may still satisfy
Howey’s requirement.84
Two years later, in yet another case involving discretionary futures
commodities and Merrill Lynch, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
followed suit and illustrated the high level of acceptance the pooling of
investor’s interest requirement had achieved.85 Treating the requirement
as the fulcrum in horizontal commonality analysis, Judge Hunter, in one
sentence of reasoning, found that the discretionary accounts involved
did not exhibit the requisite characteristics of an investment contract.86
2.

Broad Vertical Commonality

Instead of examining the synergy between investors’ fortunes,
vertical commonality generally shifts the focus to the relationship
79
Milnarik, 457 F.2d at 275. Commodities themselves are not securities. Curran, 622 F.2d
at 221. However, courts have determined that when commodity accounts are managed by
a third party on behalf of an investor, the agreement between the investor and the
promoter—in this case the commodity account manager—is an investment contract. Id.
Thus, as an investment contract, it is subject to regulation under the 1933 Act. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(a)(1) (2006).
80
Milnarik, 457 F.2d at 275.
81
Id. at 276.
82
Curran, 622 F.2d at 222.
83
Id.
84
Id.; see SEC v. Cont’l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d. 516, 520 n.9 (5th Cir. 1974) (noting
the distinction between an underlying product not being a security, but the overarching
scheme designed to invest in such products for the production of money may be a
security).
85
Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, 682 F.2d 459, 460 (3d Cir. 1982).
86
Id.
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between the individual investor and the promoter of the investment
product.87 More specifically, broad vertical commonality looks closely at
the relationship between the promoters’ efforts in conjunction with the
investors’ fortunes.88 Courts that follow horizontal commonality are
quick to point out that shifting the analysis from the relationship
between investors’ fortunes to the relationship between investors’
fortunes and the promoter’s efforts, blends the second and fourth prongs
of Howey.89 Consequently, a lower standard for commonality is created
in comparison to the horizontal commonality test.90
One of the earliest cases developing the foundation for broad vertical
commonality came out of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in a case
that involved the resale of second trust deeds and second mortgages. 91
The Ninth Circuit held that such investments met the commonality
element of Howey, and thus qualified as an investment contract because
the fortunes of the investors were “inextricably woven” with the efforts
of the promoter, not that of other investors.92 The Fifth Circuit Court of
87
See SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478 (5th Cir. 1974) (declaring the
most important factor in vertical commonality is “the uniformity of impact of the
promoter’s efforts” on the investor’s fortune). The court in Koscot Interplanetary went on to
interpret Howey as applying a form of vertical commonality. Id. Its interpretation centered
around the notion that investors only bought into the investment scheme in Howey because
of their ability to rely on the management company to produce profits. Id.
88
Id.
89
See Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 1994) (recognizing that by
allowing commonality to be satisfied by showing the fortunes of the investor are tied to the
efforts of the promoter, the second and fourth prongs are simply combined into one
question); Berman v. Bache, 467 F. Supp. 311, 319 (S.D. Ohio 1979); see also supra Part II.D
(stating the fourth prong evaluates the nature of the effort the promoter must put forth in
order for the investors to make their intended profit); infra Part III.B (explaining if the
commonality prong also incorporates an analysis of the promoter’s efforts, a degree of
redundancy can be found).
90
See LARRY D. SODERQUIST & THERESA A. GABALDON, SECURITIES LAW 5 (4th ed. 2011)
(describing the more restrictive requirements for horizontal commonality and the less
restrictive requirements for strict vertical commonality and broad vertical commonality);
Shawn Hill Crook, Comment, What is a Common Enterprise? Horizontal and Vertical
Commonality in an Investment Contract Analysis, 19 CUMB. L. REV. 323, 329–30 (1989)
(considering strict vertical commonality to be less restrictive than horizontal commonality
but more restrictive than broad vertical commonality); see also, Hocking v. Dubois, 839 F.2d
560, 567 (9th Cir. 1988) (stipulating that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has endorsed
strict vertical commonality, but not to the full exclusion of horizontal commonality).
91
See L.A. Trust Deed & Mortg. Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 172 (9th Cir. 1960) (laying
down the foundational reasoning for the subsequent development of the broad vertical
commonality test).
92
Id.
We find ‘a common enterprise’ in which the appellants and the
purchasers of second trust deed notes have an economic
interest . . . [that] is inextricably woven with the ability of [the
promoter] to locate by the exercise of its independent judgment a
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Appeals, widely credited with creating broad vertical commonality,
relied on the same reasoning when it derived the broad vertical
commonality test.93
In SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., the Fifth Circuit applied the
broad vertical commonality test to a case involving a pyramid scheme.94
The Koscot Interplanetary court held that the critical element of the scheme
providing commonality was similar to the citrus grove scheme in Howey
in that each individual participant’s fortunes were dependent upon the
efforts of the promoter.95 If there was any question as to whether the
sufficient number of discounted trust deeds, and the ability of [the
promoter] to subsequently meet its commitments . . . .
Id. This language actually speaks to both the efforts and the fortunes of the promoter as they
relate to individual investors. Id. As such, it subsequently became the basis for both broad
and strict vertical commonality. See Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d at 478 (formulating
broad vertical commonality); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7
(9th Cir. 1973) (adopting strict vertical commonality).
93
Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d at 478; see Curran v. Merrill Lynch, 622 F.2d 216,
222 (6th Cir. 1980) (denouncing broad vertical commonality). While adopting horizontal
commonality, the court made it a point to expressly disassociate with the broad vertical
commonality test by stating, “we necessarily reject the vertical commonality approach
primarily championed by the Fifth Circuit’s decision . . . .” Id.; see also Meredith v.
Conticommodity Servs., Inc., No. 79-1282, 1980 WL 1465, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 1980)
(acknowledging that the vertical commonality requirement was championed primarily by
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals).
94
See Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d at 475 (describing how a pyramid scheme
works). The scheme in Koscot Interplanetary consisted of a structured hierarchy that
rewarded larger profits as a participant ascended through the ranks. Id. At the bottom of
the pyramid structure, numerous entry-level “beauty advisor[s]” could invest in the
scheme for the right to purchase cosmetic products at a forty-five percent discount, and
then sell those products on margin for a profit. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If a
participant wished, they could elevate to the second level of the pyramid and become a
“supervisor or retail manager.” Id. At the second level, the participant had to make an
investment of $1,000 in exchange for a greater discount on the same cosmetic products,
usually fifty-five percent, and then the participant could increase their profit potential. Id.
Additionally, any participant on the second level could recruit a first level “beauty
advisor” and receive an additional $600. Id. The highest level was that of a distributor, at
which point, discounts reached sixty-five percent. Id. Plus, the distributor received $600 or
$3,000 for each recruit they brought into the Koscot Interplanetary scheme. Id. The scheme
rewarded those who could recruit and retain subordinate participants and promoted the
scheme in a veil of secrecy. Id.
95
See id. at 478. (giving a broad characterization to the investment scheme in Howey by
saying the only way an individual investor’s fortunes were tied to other investors’ fortunes,
were through the generalization that each investor would prosper if the whole enterprise
prospered). Such a generalization would give rise to horizontal commonality, but because
of the court reading the Howey facts as individual investors receiving profits in relation to
their individual plot, vertical commonality can be derived therein. See SEC v. W.J. Howey
Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946) (stating that each investor’s “respective shares in th[e]
enterprise [were] evidenced by land sales contracts and warranty deeds, which serve as a
convenient method of determining the investors’ allocable shares of the profits”).
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Fifth Circuit would adhere to broad vertical commonality, it was put to
rest just two days later when it decided SEC v. Continental Commodities
Corp.96 The Fifth Circuit expressly rejected the Seventh Circuit’s
reasoning in Milnarik, which solidified horizontal commonality.97
Instead, the Third Circuit held the exact opposite, claiming that the
Milnarik view was incompatible with views of the Supreme Court.98
Distinguishing itself from Milnarik, the court furthered the notion that a
promoter’s expertise is a key factor to consider when evaluating the
promoter’s efforts.99
Through the interpretations rendered by both the Ninth Circuit and
the Fifth Circuit, it is clear that in order for broad vertical commonality to
exist, the fortunes of the investor must be directly tied to the efforts of
the promoter.100 Those efforts can be evidenced by a showing that the
investor relied on a high level of promoter expertise in the industry for
which the investor placed his money.101
3.

Strict Vertical Commonality

Strict vertical commonality is distinguishable from broad vertical
commonality in that the former shifts the focal point from the efforts of
the promoter to the fortunes of the promoter.102 Thus, the commonality
96
Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d at 473; SEC v. Continental Commoditie Corp., 497
F.2d 516, 516 (5th Cir. 1974). Koscot Interplanetary was decided on July 15, 1974. 497 F.2d at
473. Continental Commodities was decided on July 17, 1974. 497 F.2d at 516.
97
Cont’l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d at 521.
98
Id.
99
See id. at 522 (defining the key question to whether the investors’ success is dependent
upon the promoter’s expertise because the investors lack the necessary expertise to produce
the profits they seek); Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129, 142 (5th Cir. 1989) (explaining
that an investor can meet the broad vertical commonality test if he lacks knowledge or
expertise of the investment scheme).
100
See supra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing L.A. Trust Deed & Mortg. Exch. v.
SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 172 (9th Cir. 1960)); see also Cont’l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d at 522
(defining the key question to whether the investors’ success is dependent upon the
promoter’s expertise because the investors lack the necessary expertise to produce the
profits they seek).
101
See Cont’l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d at 522 (finding an investment contract because
the investors lacked the necessary business skills to handle such accounts, and therefore
must rely heavily on the expertise of the promoter).
102
Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978); see SEC v. R.G. Reynolds
Enters., Inc., 952 F.2d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991) (reasoning that because the promoter’s
fortunes were contingent upon the fortunes of his investors, vertical commonality existed
and the second prong of Howey was satisfied); DAVID BARROWS & JOHN SMITHIN,
FUNDAMENTALS OF ECONOMICS FOR BUSINESS 22–26, 66–67 (2d ed. 2009) (explaining that a
promoter utilizing a flat rate commission structure would demand an amount roughly
equal to that which the promoter would garner under a percentage based commission
structure).
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element is met when an investor’s fortune fluctuates in harmony with
the promoter’s fortunes.103 This is not to be confused with horizontal
commonality because, under that analysis, the focus would be an
investor’s fortune versus other individual investors’ fortunes.104 Unlike
horizontal commonality, strict vertical commonality allows for an
investment scheme to exist even if there is only one investor.105 Strict
vertical commonality carries a slightly greater standard than its next in
kin, broad vertical commonality, but still a much lower standard than
horizontal commonality.106
Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals laid the foundation for
vertical commonality in general, it has followed strict vertical
commonality in subsequent cases.107 Most notably, the Ninth Circuit
applied strict vertical commonality to an investment scheme involving
discretionary commodities trading accounts.108 The court held the
investment scheme was not an investment contract, and thus not a
security because there lacked a correlation between the success of the

103
See SEC v. Eurobond Exch., Ltd., 13 F.3d 1334, 1340 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that strict
commonality existed because both the investor and the promoter shared the risk of profits
and losses in the same enterprise).
104
See supra Part II.E.1 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements of horizontal
commonality).
105
See Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1976) (accepting the proposition that
commonality is required between the investor and the promoter, not multiple investors).
106
See SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 90, at 5 (explaining that horizontal
commonality requires “multiple investors and a sharing or pooling of funds,” making it
more restrictive than strict vertical commonality, which requires a linking of investors’ and
promoters’ fortunes or broad vertical commonality, which only requires a linking of
efforts); Crook, supra note 90, at 329–30 (considering strict vertical commonality to be less
restrictive than horizontal commonality, but more restrictive than broad vertical
commonality).
107
L.A. Trust Deed & Mortg. Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 165 (9th Cir. 1960); see SEC v.
Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir. 1973) (pulling language from
L.A. Trust Deed). But see Hocking v. Dubois, 839 F.2d 560, 567 (9th Cir. 1988) (stipulating
that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has endorsed strict vertical commonality, but not to
the full exclusion of horizontal commonality).
108
Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 460 (9th Cir. 1978). The investment scheme in
Brodt is the same type of investment scheme analyzed by the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals. Id. However, the Seventh Circuit used horizontal commonality to find no
investment contract existed since the fortunes of the investors did not rise and fall together
in harmony. See Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 276–77 (7th Cir. 1972)
(adopting horizontal commonality). Brodt is a good illustration of how courts can use any
of the three commonality tests to analyze the same type of investment scheme and still
reach the same conclusion. 595 F.2d at 460; see also Stenger v. R.H. Love Galleries, Inc., 741
F.2d 144, 146 (7th Cir. 1984) (illustrating an investment scheme that fails multiple
commonality tests and as such, is not a security).
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investor and the success of the promoter.109 Furthermore, the court took
the added step of clarifying any confusion regarding whether or not an
investment scheme must have an element of substantial risk of loss to
meet the commonality requirement.110 Apparently recognizing a rising
use of the substantial risk test, the court rejected such a requirement and
thus limited the analysis to the relationship between the fortunes of the
investor and the fortunes of the promoter.111
F.

Summary of the Circuit Split

To date, the horizontal commonality test has been adopted and
regularly used by the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits.112 Broad
vertical commonality is mostly confined to the Fifth Circuit.113 The
Eighth Circuit favors vertical commonality; however, it is unclear

109
Brodt, 595 F.2d at 461. The court noted that the promoter could still reap large
commissions and be considered successful while the investor actually loses his investment.
Id. If, however, the promoter’s commission had been tied directly to the success or failure
of investor’s account, the investment scheme would most likely have been considered an
investment contract under strict vertical commonality. Id. For illustrative effect, such a
scheme, where the commission of the promoter is dependent upon the success or failure of
the investor, would likely qualify under broad vertical commonality because the investor’s
fortunes are heavily dependent upon the efforts of the promoter to successfully invest in
the right commodities. See SEC v. Cont’l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir.
1974) (finding a similar commodities trading account scheme to be an investment contract
because the investors lacked the necessary business skills to handle such accounts, and
therefore must rely heavily on the expertise of the promoter). However, the investment
scheme would still lack the requisite pooling of funds or pro-rata distribution of profits to
qualify under horizontal commonality. See Milnarik, 457 F.2d at 275–76 (holding similar
commodities trading accounts were not investment contracts).
110
See Brodt, 595 F.2d at 461 (recognizing that in a previous case, the court had
inadvertently given greater weight to the fact that investors were not involved in a
substantial risk of losing their money to find commonality existed); see also United States v.
Carman, 577 F.2d 556, 563–64 (9th Cir. 1978) (neglecting the fact that no common enterprise
existed, as defined by either vertical commonality test, the court still held a common
enterprise was present since the investors experienced a substantial risk of loss on their
investment). The substantial risk of loss factor had not been present in prior commonality
precedent, which is why the court elected to correct itself in Brodt, 595 F.2d at 461.
111
See supra note 108 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Brodt); see also supra
note 110 (noting that the court recognized it had inadvertently bolstered the substantial risk
test).
112
See Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, 682 F.2d 459, 460 (3d Cir. 1982) (adopting horizontal
commonality); see also Curran v. Merrill Lynch, 622 F.2d 216, 222 (6th Cir. 1980) (dispensing
vertical commonality in favor of horizontal commonality); Milnarik, 457 F.2d at 276
(evaluating the various commonality approaches before settling on horizontal
commonality).
113
See supra note 87 (discussing SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478 (5th
Cir. 1974)).
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whether broad vertical or strict vertical commonality is preferred.114
Although the Ninth Circuit first laid the foundation for both broad and
strict vertical commonality, it has since applied the strict vertical
commonality test more often than the broad vertical commonality test.115
Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has used a combination
of both vertical commonality tests while expressly rejecting horizontal
commonality.116 In the Eleventh Circuit, it appears broad vertical
commonality is favored.117 As for the remaining circuits—the First,
Second, and Fourth Circuits—the issue has yet to be decided as all have
declined the opportunity to clarify the matter even though the district
courts within their circuits are inconsistent in applying one test over the
others.118

114
See Miller v. Cent. Chinchilla Grp., 494 F.2d 414, 416 (8th Cir. 1974) (citing a Ninth
Circuit holding, which based its decision on strict vertical commonality, even though the
majority of reasoning focused on the efforts of the promoter: typically indicative of broad
vertical commonality).
115
See supra note 91 (discussing L.A. Trust Deed & Mortg. Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 165
(9th Cir. 1960)); see also SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir.
1973) (pulling language from L.A. Trust Deed, 285 F.2d at 165). But see Hocking v. Dubois,
839 F.2d 560, 567 (9th Cir. 1988) (stipulating that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has
endorsed strict vertical commonality, but not to the full exclusion of horizontal
commonality).
116
See McGill v. Am. Land & Exploration Co., 776 F.2d 923, 925 (10th Cir. 1985) (“The
rigid ‘horizontal commonality’ requirement . . . has never been a part of the law of this
circuit.”).
117
Messer v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 833 F.2d 909, 915 (11th Cir. 1987). Although the court
focused its holding on the efforts of the promoter under the fourth prong of Howey, the
court nonetheless cited a Fifth Circuit case to help guide its decision. Id. The Fifth Circuit
follows broad vertical commonality. SEC v. Cont’l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 516
(5th Cir. 1974); Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d at 478; see also supra Part II.E.2.
(identifying which circuits follow broad vertical commonality).
118
See Crook, supra note 90, at 332–49 (comprising an excellent list of cases from each
circuit court of appeals and the district courts within each circuit). For example, within the
First Circuit, the District of Massachusetts originally adopted horizontal commonality only
to switch to strict vertical commonality later. See Gaudette v. Panos, 644 F. Supp. 826, 834
(D. Mass. 1986) (adopting strict vertical commonality); Schofield v. First Commodity Corp.,
638 F. Supp. 4, 6 (D. Mass. 1985); Holtzman v. Proctor, Cook & Co., Inc., 528 F. Supp. 9, 15–
16 (D. Mass 1981) (exclaiming a preference for horizontal commonality while still
acknowledging that the scheme at bar would not fit horizontal or either vertical
commonality tests). The use of varying tests also occurs in the Second Circuit. See In re Gas
Reclamation, Inc. Sec. Litig., 659 F. Supp. 493, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (applying strict vertical
commonality); Silverstein v. Merrill Lynch, 618 F. Supp. 436, 438–39 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(utilizing horizontal commonality). The discrepancy between tests is evident in the Fourth
Circuit as well. See Waterman v. Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 797, 802–03 (E.D.N.C.
1986) (finding broad vertical commonality more persuasive); Burton v. Heinold
Commodities, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 360, 361–62 (E.D. Va. 1986) (applying horizontal
commonality).
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III. ANALYSIS
Allowing three separate tests to exist offends the basic reasoning
behind implementation of the 1933 Act.119 In theory, a financial product
either qualifies as a security and is subject to federal regulation, or does
not qualify and escapes such regulation. In reality, the disagreement
among the circuit courts causes a financial product to be classified as a
security in one circuit while not being considered a security in others.120
Part III analyzes the weaknesses and pitfalls of each commonality test.
More specifically, Part III.A illustrates the overly restrictive nature of the
horizontal commonality test used predominantly by the Third, Sixth, and

119
See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing how blue sky laws were
inconsistent in their approaches as either pro-business or pro-investor and how such
approaches helped fuel the need for federal securities regulation that would be more
consistent).
120
See SEC v. Cont’l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 521 (5th Cir. 1974). Unlike the
Seventh Circuit, the court held that a discretionary trading account in commodities futures
was a security and thus allowed plaintiffs to continue their suit seeking damages for fraud.
Id. at 522–23. The court analyzed the accounts by asking whether the profits of the
investments collectively were dependent on the promoter’s expertise and then buttressed
its point by stating:
[t]hat it may bear more productive fruits in the case of some options
than it does in cases of others should not vitiate the essential fact that
the success of the trading enterprise as a whole and customer
investments individually is contingent upon the sagacious investment
counseling of [the promoter].
Id. at 522–23; see also supra note 79 (discussing the definition of a commodities future). But
see Curran v. Merrill Lynch, 622 F.2d 216, 222 (6th Cir. 1980) (following the Seventh
Circuit’s lead by denouncing vertical commonality in favor of horizontal commonality to
find that discretionary commodity trading accounts lack the requisite commonality
demanded by the court’s reading of Howey); Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d
274, 276–77 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that a discretionary trading account in commodities
futures was not a security, and as a result, petitioners could not recover their initial deposit
amount of $13,662 from the promoter who fraudulently squandered it away). The Sixth
Circuit held that the discretionary commodity trading accounts involved were not
investment contracts, and thus not securities. Curran, 622 F.2d at 222. The Sixth Circuit
also directly attacked the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning by quoting its language in Continental
Commodities before countering that “[a]lthough [the Fifth Circuit’s] approach has attracted
some support, we believe that no horizontal common enterprise can exist unless there also
exists between discretionary account customers themselves some relationship which ties
the fortunes of each investor to the success of the overall venture.” Id. at 223–24 (footnote
omitted). The Sixth Circuit felt commonality based solely on the relationship between the
promoter and an individual investor was inconsistent with Howey. Id. Following this line
of cases, an investor living in the Fifth Circuit will potentially be able to recover based on
statutory causes of actions while an investor residing in the Sixth Circuit is barred from
similar claims even though the underlying investment product is identical, equally as risky,
and equally as open to fraudulent promoter deception worthy of disclosure. See cases cited
supra.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol46/iss2/10

Stegemoller: Refocusing Commonality: An Economic Approach that Shares Somethin

2012]

Refocusing Commonality

679

Seventh Circuits.121 Next, Part III.B discusses the repetitive requirement
utilized by broad vertical commonality to weigh an investor’s reliance on
the promoter’s expertise.122 Finally, Part III.C discusses strict vertical
commonality’s departure from Howey by relying on form over substance
and ignoring the economic realities of the given transaction.123
A. The Overly Restrictive Horizontal Commonality Test
Horizontal commonality requires the success of each individual to be
tied to the success of every other individual investor in an enterprise.124
Consequently, if an enterprise only involves one investor, that investor’s
success can never be tied to the success of other investors as no other
investors exist.125 As a result, investment schemes involving only one
investor are not covered by the horizontal commonality test.126
Commentators have argued that this fact alone is enough to characterize
the test as overly restrictive.127 However, some investment schemes
involving one promoter and one investor may be organized in a way that
does not mandate the federal government’s involvement.128 The
121
See infra Part III.A (discussing the overly restrictive nature of horizontal
commonality).
122
See infra Part III.B (discussing the redundancy that is an inherent characteristic of
broad vertical commonality).
123
See infra Part III.C (arguing that strict vertical commonality produces inconsistent
results).
124
See Stenger v. R.H. Love Galleries, Inc., 741 F.2d 144, 146 (7th Cir. 1984) (“[The]
‘horizontal’ test of common enterprise . . . [is when] investors . . . pool their investments
and receive pro rata profits.” (citing Milnarik, 457 F.2d 274)).
125
Id.
126
See Curran v. Merrill Lynch, 622 F.2d 216, 225 (6th Cir. 1980) (characterizing the
relationship between the promoter and investor as a one-on-one relationship whereby the
investor’s monies were compartmentalized into an individual account separated from
other investors so as to not trigger horizontal commonality).
127
See Gordon III, supra note 69, at 91 (“[H]orizontal commonality is a restrictive test that
excludes many instruments sold as investments.”); Monaghan, supra note 69, at 2156
(suggesting that horizontal commonality “is unduly restrictive” because it limits the types
of investment schemes to those which include “more than one investor”); see also Alcser,
supra note 69, at 1233–34 (discussing the heightened need for disclosure in situations
involving only one investor based on the economic theory of diversification).
128
See Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1976) (finding that a relationship
between a grain farmer, a feedlot operator, and a bank could satisfy the common enterprise
requirement if both the farmer and the bank were dependent upon the success of the
feedlot for generating a return on their investments). The facts of this case are a great
illustration of the ways in which promoters devise creative investment schemes potentially
worthy of federal regulation. Id. at 431. In Hector, a grain farmer entered into an
agreement with a feedlot and a bank. Id. The feedlot agreed to buy, feed, and sell cattle
and hogs on behalf of the farmer’s account in exchange for the grain farmer supplying
grain to the feedlot. Id. As such, the consideration in this agreement was a commodity as
opposed to cash. Id. Additionally, the bank agreed to finance all livestock purchases by
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following explores the requisite relationship between promoters and
investors necessary to trigger horizontal commonality and how the test
promotes circumvention.
In scenarios involving transactions where the parties are closely
acquainted, the investor presumably has a relationship with the
promoter whereby the investor can demand the necessary information
required to make educated decisions and evaluate for himself whether
fraud exists in the transaction.129 In this sense, horizontal commonality is
logical because mandating that the promoter disclose information would
be paternalistic in such scenarios.130 If a promoter were to enter into
multiple transactions involving closely acquainted parties of similar
construction, the scheme would be of a different character.131 In the
former, the investor has a more intimate relationship with the promoter
that creates less of an opportunity for fraud.132 In the latter, the size of
the promoter’s operation has increased, which may allow him to hide
information from individual promoters, and thus increases the
likelihood of fraud.133 Unfortunately, horizontal commonality would
allow these investment schemes to go unregulated even though it
appears to qualify as the type Congress intended to thwart by requiring
issuing notes to the farmer with the underlying collateral being the livestock themselves.
Id. The arrangement in Hector would likely fail other elements of Howey, but the court
made it clear that commonality could exist even though the investment scheme only
involved one investor. Id. at 433.
129
15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2006). The 1933 Act allows an exemption for “transactions by an
issuer not involving any public offering.” Id. This exception is known as the private
offering exemption and allows promoters dealing in close relationship with his investors to
forgo adherence to registration and disclosure regulations imposed by the 1933 Act. Van
Dyke v. Coburn Enters., Inc., 873 F.2d 1094, 1098 (8th Cir. 1989). Courts have recognized
that the exemption applies to investors who are in need of protection and not to investors
who have access to such information. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
However, if an investor has a close relationship with the promoter—employment, family,
superior bargaining power—the private offering exemption does apply. Doran v. Petrol.
Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 903 (5th Cir. 1977).
130
See supra note 43 and accompanying text (detailing the purpose of the 1933 Act and
noting that Congress intended to promote disclosure).
131
See Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 276–77 (7th Cir. 1972)
(acknowledging that by engaging in similar discretionary arrangements with other
investors, the character of the promoter’s scheme was different than what it would be if all
of the investors’ monies had been put together to finance the scheme).
132
See supra note 108 (noting cases involving transactions that resulted in fraud).
133
See supra Part II.A (discussing the historical business schemes that contributed to the
need for federal regulation). Note that the schemes discussed in Part II.A involved
business structures of large size, which arguably contributed to their ability to hide
material information investors needed to make accurate investment decisions. See LOSS &
SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 5, at 4 (describing two companies so large,
Mississippi Company and South Sea Company, that the British government granted them a
monopoly over the shipping and trading industry).
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disclosure.134 This analysis is consistent with Howey’s substance over
form approach.135
Furthermore, some argue horizontal commonality places too much
value on the need for an investment scheme to utilize pooling of investor
funds.136 As courts applying either of the vertical commonality
approaches have illustrated, investment schemes that lack the pooling
feature exist and, nonetheless, need to be regulated by mandatory
disclosure.137 A promoter can easily circumvent the pooling requirement
by simply keeping his investors’ monies separate from one another.138
The mere use of preferred accounting techniques shares no
correlation with the need for disclosure of information.139 Even more, a
fraudulent investment scheme is no less worthy of regulation simply
because the invested monies are compartmentalized.140 The inability of
the horizontal commonality test to capture promoters crafty enough to
keep investors’ monies separated, even though the essence of the scheme
mirrors a common enterprise, renders the test overly restrictive.141

134
See supra note 43 (discussing Congress’s intent to mandate disclosure of material
information).
135
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co, 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). The Court considered its approach to
be one that “embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of
adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use
of the money of others on the promise of profits.” Id.
136
See Gordon III, supra note 69, at 91 (arguing that “horizontal commonality
is . . . restrictive . . . [because it] excludes many instruments sold as investments”);
Monaghan, supra note 69, at 2156 (suggesting that “[h]orizontal commonality is also overly
exclusive” because it places too great an emphasis on the pooling).
137
See Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, 682 F.2d 459, 461 (3d Cir. 1982) (involving the resale of
second trust deeds and second mortgages); Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 460 (9th Cir.
1978) (involving discretionary commodity trading accounts); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary,
Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 475 (5th Cir. 1974) (involving a multi-level pyramid scheme); SEC v.
Cont’l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 521 (5th Cir. 1974) (involving discretionary
commodity trading accounts).
138
See Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 277 (7th Cir. 1972) (recognizing
that the investment scheme involved does not meet commonality because the promoter set
up individual contracts with each investor thereby “creating [a] relationship [that] is
unitary in nature” (quoting Milnarik, 320 F. Supp. at 1151–52)).
139
See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text (noting that Congress intended to
compel and regulate the disclosure of information, not monitor accounting practices).
140
See Cont’l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d at 521 (finding commonality existed in a
situation that involved a promoter who set up an individual account for each investor and
made trades in commodities futures for one account irrespective of the other accounts).
141
See supra note 127 (providing articles, which argue that horizontal commonality is
overly restrictive).
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B. The Inherent Redundancy in Broad Vertical Commonality
If an individual investor’s fortunes are dependent upon the efforts of
the promoter, the scheme in which the investor has joined meets broad
vertical commonality and is an investment contract under the 1933
Act.142 The test only requires that an investor rely on the promoter’s
expertise, not that the investor be uneducated in the business for which
he has invested.143 However, the test’s reliance on the promoter’s
expertise seems to blend several prongs of the Howey test and place extra
weight upon the investor’s reliance on the efforts and expertise of the
promoter to produce returns on his investment.144 Even though some
argue broad vertical commonality properly protects investors, it is clear
the protection and the reasoning behind it are misguided.
Congress may have intended to protect investors from fraudulent
investment schemes, but it did not intend to protect investors from
themselves.145 Even still, some commentators trumpet congressional
intent while arguing that broad commonality penalizes knowledgeable

See supra Part II.E.2 (discussing broad vertical commonality).
Cases discuss the increased need for federal protection when an investor is not
knowledgeable about a given industry or business in which the investment scheme may
operate, but no cases take the converse logical step of holding that a knowledgeable
investor is precluded from relying on the expertise of a promoter. See SEC v. W.J. Howey
Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299–300 (1946) (noting that the investors that bought into the citrus grove
lacked the requisite knowledge to cultivate and market the crops produced on their
individual parcels of land). This reasoning is grounded on the presumption that an
uneducated investor is less capable of detecting fraudulent practices of the promoter. Id.
Moreover, it is precisely the efforts and expertise of the promoter that attract
knowledgeable investors because the investor, although knowledgeable, may not have the
ability, time, desire, or equipment to perform the necessary actions required to create a
return on their investment. See id. at 296 (noting that the investors involved were actually
business and professional people). Furthermore, the investor may be knowledgeable
regarding the business in which the scheme operates, but it does not follow that the
knowledge possessed by the investor includes the ability to detect fraud and manipulative
practices of the promoter, especially if the promoter is keen in the art of deception. Id. It is
the protection from deception that securities laws were designed to provide, not protection
from losses suffered because a knowledgeable investor relied on an incompetent promoter.
See supra note 43 and accompanying text (quoting Congress during the promulgation of the
1933 Act, “[t]he aim is to prevent further exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound,
fraudulent, and worthless securities through misrepresentation”).
144
See infra note 151 and accompanying text (providing the Second Circuit’s
identification of the blending problem that occurs when broad vertical commonality is
used).
145
See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (stating the purpose of the
1933 and 1934 Acts was “to protect investors against fraud”); Hecht v. Harris, Upham &
Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 428 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (stating that Congress intended “to protect the
innocent investor, as distinguished from one who loses his innocence and waits to see how
his investment turns out before he decides to invoke the act . . . .”).
142
143
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investors to protect ignorant investors.146 Courts indicate that an
investor satisfies the broad vertical commonality test if she lacks
knowledge and experience in the underlying investment scheme.147
However, the converse is not true in that a knowledgeable investor is not
precluded from recovering losses incurred in a fraudulent investment
scheme.148 So long as the knowledgeable investor relies on the
promoter’s expertise in the given field, she too can recover.149 Therefore,
broad commonality protects ignorant and knowledgeable investors
alike.150
Notwithstanding the knowledgeable investor argument, broad
commonality is flawed because it reapplies the same reliance analysis
already mandated by the fourth prong of the Howey test.151 The fourth
prong requires that an investor rely solely on the efforts of others to
make the desired return on investment.152 Implicit in this requirement is
that an investor who relies on the efforts of someone else assumes that
person has the requisite ability to generate a return.153 The promoter’s
ability to generate return is fundamentally made up of his own
knowledge of the given business environment, expertise in operating the
investment scheme, and performance capabilities.154 As such, the fourth

146
See Alcser, supra note 69, at 1236–37 (inferring that because a court finds commonality
in light of an investor’s lack of expertise it would not find commonality in light of an
investor’s expertise).
147
Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129, 142 (5th Cir. 1989).
148
See Howey, 328 U.S. at 296 (noting that most of the investors in the citrus grove scheme
were business and professional people). The investors were thus knowledgeable regarding
general business practices, but not specifically in the citrus industry. Id. Furthermore, the
Court relied more on the fact that they lacked the desire, skill, and equipment necessary to
actually work in the fields and market the fruits produced by cultivation. Id. at 296, 299–
300.
149
See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing courts’ emphasis on investors
relying on promoters’ expertise). If an investor relies on the expertise of the promoter and
an investor does not possess business acumen in the relevant industry, commonality will
be found. SEC v. Cont’l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 1974).
150
See supra Part III.B (discussing broad vertical commonality).
151
See Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 1994) (recognizing that by
allowing commonality to be satisfied by showing the fortunes of the investor are tied to the
efforts of the promoter, the second and fourth prongs are simply combined into one
question).
152
See supra Part II.D (outlining the four elements of the Howey test).
153
See Howey, 328 U.S. at 299–300 (recognizing that in order for the investors to achieve
their return on investment, it is essential for the promoter to possess the requisite
capabilities to generate the expected profits).
154
See id. (implying that promoters were able to sustain their operation because they
possessed the necessary ability to cultivate and harvest citrus fruit and the ability to market
the yielded crops to purchasers).
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prong already incorporates weighing the degree of an investor’s reliance
on the expertise of the promoter.155
When promulgating the Howey test, the Court expressly dictated
four separate requirements that must be present before an investment
scheme can be classified as a security.156 Using broad commonality
erodes the independent significance of the commonality element in favor
of doubling the need to weigh an investor’s reliance on the promoter.157
Had the Howey Court intended to place so much emphasis on the
reliance among parties, it could have done so and not included a need to
analyze the structural characteristics of the scheme. Indeed, it is the
substance of an investment scheme that separates those investment
schemes that are worthy of regulation from those that are not.158
Without a separate requirement of a common enterprise, many
investment schemes not deserving of regulation would fall under the
1933 Act.159 This results in the broad commonality being what its name
suggests, broader than even Congress’s intended scope of the 1933
Act.160
See supra Part II.D (outlining the fourth element of the Howey test).
See Howey, 328 U.S. at 301 (creating a four part test to determine whether an
investment contract is a security).
157
To be sure, consider the fact pattern in Koscot Interplanetary. 497 F.2d 473, 475–76 (5th
Cir. 1974). Individuals invested in the defendant’s multi-level pyramid scheme whereby
the defendant promoter would sell the investor cosmetic merchandise at a discount price
and encouraged the investor to recruit more investors to sell the discounted cosmetics to in
turn. Id. at 475–76. The SEC brought suit to enjoin the defendant from marketing its
scheme based on the fact that the promoter practiced fraudulent sales techniques including
high-pressure sales seminars. Id. at 474–75. The case turned on whether or not the scheme
utilized by the promoter was an investment contract, and thus a security within the reach
of the 1933 Act. Id. at 474. Application of the Howey test revealed that there most definitely
was an investment of money with an expectation of profiting in reliance solely on the
efforts of others—satisfying prongs one, three, and four. Id. To determine if the scheme is
a common enterprise—the second prong—the court then looked to whether the investor
relied on the expertise and knowledge of the promoter. Id. at 478–79. In doing so, this was
the court’s second pass at determining the degree of reliance the investor had on the
promoter. Id. By inquiring into the investor’s reliance two times, the court placed an
exaggerated amount of weight on the second and fourth prongs of Howey while at the same
time deemphasizing the significance of the other prongs. Id.
158
See supra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing the substance over form
approach outlined in Howey).
159
See supra note 129 (noting Congress included a “private offering exemption” for
situations involving a close relationship between the promoter and the investor). Without
a common enterprise requirement, investment schemes specifically exempted by Congress
would nonetheless fall under federal protection. See Doran v. Petrol. Mgmt. Corp., 545
F.2d 893, 903 (5th Cir. 1977) (confronting the issue of applying securities to investment
schemes between closely related parties).
160
See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982) (emphasizing that Congress
placed some limitations on the broad scope of the 1933 Act). The Court stated, “we are
155
156
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C. The Inconsistencies of Strict Vertical Commonality
At first glance, strict vertical commonality appears similar to
horizontal commonality; however, the only thing shared is an inability to
produce results consistent with the intent of Howey. One reason for such
results is that strict vertical commonality, more so than either of the two
prior tests, places a higher value on form over substance—the antithesis
of Howey.161 For any investment scheme to be classified as a security
under strict vertical commonality, the investor’s fortunes must fluctuate
in harmony with the promoter’s fortunes.162 In effect, it is only when the
investor realizes a profit that the promoter too realizes a profit from the
enterprise.163 Given that there is a multitude of ways a promoter could
conceivably structure the compensation for his efforts, strict vertical
commonality promotes form over substance.164
Moreover, by
emphasizing an investment scheme’s form as it looks on paper, strict
vertical commonality produces inconsistent results hinging on the
promoter’s compensation structure as opposed to the economic realities
driving the investment scheme.165
An illustrative example of such a venture is a scheme whereby the
promoter receives a percentage commission based on the performance of
the enterprise.166 Assuming the other three prongs of Howey are met,
such an arrangement would undoubtedly be the type Congress intended
satisfied that Congress, in enacting the securities laws, did not intend to provide a broad
federal remedy for all . . . .” Id.
161
See id. (stressing that the Supreme Court has “repeatedly held that the test ‘is what
character the instrument is given in commerce by the terms of the offer, the plan of
distribution, and the economic inducements held out to the prospect’” (quoting SEC v. C.
M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 352-53 (1943)).
162
See supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements of the
strict vertical commonality test).
163
This is unlike what occurs when a promoter structures his commission on a flat fee
basis, thus allowing himself the ability to reap gains while the investor loses money. Brodt
v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978).
164
See supra note 140 (describing a case involving a promoter that compartmentalized his
investors’ accounts).
165
See supra note 140 (describing one form of derivatives commodities accounts); see also
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975) (acknowledging that
securities transactions are economic in character and for that reason, Congress intended the
application of the 1933 Act to turn on the economic realities of the underlying investment
scheme, not the form).
166
SEC v. R.G. Reynolds Enters., Inc., 952 F.2d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 1991). In Reynolds, the
court held commonality existed because the promoter took a management fee based on a
percentage of the profits created by the investment scheme. Id. at 1130–31. The court
reasoned that because the promoter’s fortunes were contingent upon the fortunes of his
investors, vertical commonality existed and the second prong of Howey was satisfied. Id. at
1131.
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to classify as a security when it chose the phrase “investment
contract.”167 However, in reality, a promoter can circumvent the 1933
Act’s reach by structuring their business model to include a flat rate
commission instead of a percentage basis.168 In doing so, the promoter
would assure himself a monetary gain regardless of the investor’s
financial outcome.169
It is not the promoter’s gain or loss that triggers a need for investor
protection; rather, it is the deceptive nature of the investment scheme,
which necessitates disclosure.170 So, although the economic results of
both a percentage based commission and flat rate commission differ
slightly, the underlying financial product does not change.171 If, as in
Brodt, the product is a commodities derivative, the investor will maintain
the same level of risk while the promoter can deflect risk by utilizing a
flat rate commission, which promotes form over substance.172
The Court in Howey expressly denounced such an approach to
analyzing an investment contract when it constructed a test that
emphasized substance over form.173 Moreover, the Court mandated that
lower courts look to the “economic realit[ies]” of the investment scheme
to determine whether it is properly classified as an investment

Id. The Reynolds court further found that, in addition to the commonality
requirement, the investment scheme utilized by the promoter satisfied all prongs of Howey.
Id.
168
Brodt, 595 F.2d at 461. Unlike the promoter in Reynolds, the promoter in Brodt
structured his compensation as a flat fee with no correlation to the fortunes of the investor.
Id. Moreover, the promoter could make large profits as he watched the money in his
investors’ accounts be “wiped out.” Id. Although the investment schemes in both Reynolds
and Brodt were similar, the promoter in the latter was able to side step liability because he
structured his scheme on a flat fee commission basis as opposed to a percentage basis. Id.
169
See SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478 (5th Cir. 1974) (involving a
promoter who utilized a flat fee rate system to make profits regardless of individual
investors’ fortunes); see also Brodt, 595 F.2d at 461 (involving a promoter charging flat fees
and reaped large profits while his investors suffered significant losses).
170
See supra note 43 and accompanying text (quoting Congress’s intent to protect the
public and its markets from deceptive practices).
171
Regardless of how the commission is structured, basic principles of economics suggest
that a promoter will not offer services unless she is adequately compensated to
accommodate the costs of rending the services sought by the consumer. Cf. BARROWS &
SMITHIN, supra note 102, at 22–26, 66–67 (discussing the relationship between the basic
theory of supply and demand and the cost of production as they work in conjunction to
define the market price of a product or service). Thus, it can be assumed that a promoter
utilizing a flat rate commission structure would demand an amount roughly equal to that
which the promoter would garner under a percentage based commission structure. Id.
172
See supra note 168 (outing the flat fee scheme in Brodt).
173
See supra note 135 and accompanying text (noting the flexibility of the Howey test).
167
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contract.174 That being the case, strict vertical commonality ignores
economic realities by allowing promoters to alter their risk on the surface
while leaving the underlying product unchanged.175 Such an analysis
does not protect investors in accord with the spirit of the 1933 Act
because the true nature of the investment product, assuming it is
deceptive, would go untested.176
Another weakness of strict vertical commonality is the inconsistent
results it may produce despite the economic realities behind an
investment scheme. Assume two separate investors invest in two
separate schemes, each with an identical underlying business model—a
commodities derivative—yet only the investor whose promoter takes a
percentage based commission would receive federal protection.177 More
currently, it is unlikely that promoters will structure their business
models on a percentage basis. Effectively, these types of schemes have
been taken out of the 1933 Act’s regulatory reach, leaving those who
invest in such schemes unprotected.178 Given that federal securities laws
were introduced as a means of curing the inconsistencies of state’s blue
174
See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946) (acknowledging the
importance of economic realities when evaluating an investment contract for presence of
commonality).
175
See Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding no commonality in
a discretionary trading account solely because the promoter received a flat fee commission
as opposed to a percentage based commission). It can be inferred that had the promoter
taken a percentage based commission, commonality would have been found even though
the underlying investment scheme remained unchanged. Id. This is form over substance
in violation of the Supreme Court’s guidance. See supra note 135 (noting the doctrine of
Howey to place substance over form).
176
SEC v. Harwyn Indus. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 943, 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (stating “the spirit
and purpose of . . . the 1933 Act . . . is ‘to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of
information thought necessary to informed investment decisions’” (quoting SEC v. Ralston
Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953))). The court in Harwyn was tasked with analyzing the
unrelated practice of “spinning-off,” which consists of a company giving the subsidiaries
stock to its parent company in an effort to avoid the registration requirement of the 1933
Act. Id. at 945. Although “spinning-off” is unrelated to commonality, the Court
nonetheless recognized that the spirit of the 1933 Act required companies to disclose
pertinent information to investors for the sake of thwarting fraudulent practices in the
marketplace. Id. at 953 (internal quotation marks omitted).
177
See supra note 157 (discussing a case in which the promoter of a discretionary trading
account escaped commonality by charging a flat fee commission). But see SEC v. Cont’l
Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 521 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that commonality existed in a
discretionary trading account scheme).
178
Brodt, 595 F.2d at 461. Investors participating in a scheme involving a flat rate
commission are precluded from federal protection in jurisdictions utilizing strict vertical
commonality. Id. However, investors in those jurisdictions, which subscribe to either
broad vertical commonality or horizontal commonality, will likely be protected as the
scheme will meet the requirements set forth by either test for commonality. Cont’l
Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d at 521.
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sky laws, strict vertical commonality appears to ignore this overarching
aim in favor of a more arbitrary approach that breathes new life into
those inconsistencies.179
Disharmony among the circuits regarding the choice of one
commonality test is understandable given each circuit’s justifications.180
However, all three tests fail to implement the intent of Howey to have one
workable standard and the intent of Congress that securities laws be
consistent throughout the nation.181 Horizontal commonality is flawed
because it is overly restrictive and does not afford protection to classes of
investors that Congress intended to protect.182
Broad vertical
commonality also is flawed because it blends the third and fourth prong
of the Howey test together, causing courts to give extra weight to an
investor’s reliance on the promoter, thus devaluing the independent
significance of the commonality element.183 Additionally, because strict
vertical commonality places form over substance, it too is flawed.184
Allowing three flawed tests to exist amongst the circuits will continue to
cause inconsistent results, which is counter to the goal behind federal
securities laws.185
IV. CONTRIBUTION
Given the problems that exist with each version of the commonality
tests, it is clear that a fresh perspective on the matter is needed.186
Suggesting that circuits should select one test over the other two is futile
because, by now, each circuit is heavily entrenched and supportive of
Simply combining the tests into a hybrid
their chosen test.187
commonality test is impractical because there are irreconcilable
differences amongst each commonality test regarding which investors
179
See supra Part II.B (outlining Congress’s first attempt to regulate securities on a federal
level).
180
See supra Part II.E.1 (discussing circuits that subscribe to horizontal commonality and
their reasons for doing so); supra Part II.E.2 (noting the circuits that apply broad vertical
commonality and their justifications); supra Part II.E.3 (detailing those circuits in favor of
strict vertical commonality and the basis for their allegiance).
181
See supra Part II.B (providing insight to Congress’s intent to stabilize securities
regulation among the states and provide for a consistent federal regulatory scheme).
182
See supra Part III.A (analyzing the weakness of horizontal commonality).
183
See supra Part III.B (criticizing broad vertical commonality).
184
See supra Part III.C (pointing out the inconsistent results produced by strict vertical
commonality).
185
See supra Part II.B (acknowledging that Congress wanted to create consistency among
states regarding the regulation of securities).
186
See supra Part III (critiquing each commonality test).
187
See supra Part II.E (discussing each circuit’s preference for a particular commonality
test).
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would receive protection or not.188 This Part calls for a return to the
original intent of both the Court and Congress while suggesting an
economics based solution to identifying whether an investment contract
has the requisite commonality to be considered a security.
To be consistent with both the Court in Howey and Congress, any
new test must be mindful of the intent of each. According to Howey,
such a test should be flexible enough to adapt to the rapidly innovative
investment schemes that are created in the markets.189 Additionally, any
commonality test should evaluate substance over form and dig deep to
unearth the economic realities involved in a particular investment
scheme.190 Furthermore, any commonality test should be consistent with
Congress’s goal of protecting investors through disclosure and creating
consistent results across the nation, as well as being broadly applicable to
a wide range of investment schemes.191 Currently, each commonality
test runs counter to one or a combination of these intentions.192
To begin, a new commonality test should focus on whether the
investment is made in a product that gains utility when developed as
component parts of a larger whole.193 Utility means that the product
would gain an economic purpose beyond or in addition to that which is
present at the time of, or before, initial investment.194 This test can be
referred to as the increased utility test. Utility is essential if the investors
are to achieve their paramount aim of a return on their investment.195
Any intrinsic personal value or personal utility that exists when the
product stands alone is inconsequential. Additionally, for a product to
be developed, the promoter must supply some type of effort to increase
the product’s value.196 This piece of the test would most likely be met in
See Monaghan, supra note 69, at 2156 (arguing for a hybrid commonality test).
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946); see supra Part III.A and
accompanying notes (discussing Howey’s intent).
190
Howey, 328 U.S. at 298.
191
See supra note 53 (discussing the construction of federal securities laws and how
Congress intended for the laws to be broadly applicable so as to cover as many financial
instruments as possible).
192
See supra Part III (critiquing each of the three current commonality tests).
193
This proposed test is derived directly from Howey. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 300 (basing
the Court’s reasoning on the principle that the underlying product gained utility once it
was developed as component parts of a larger whole).
194
Id.
195
See id. (identifying the utility in that case as the adequacy of the personnel and
equipment implemented by the promoter to create profits for investors).
196
Unlike other commonality tests and the fourth prong of Howey, the increased utility
test does not require that courts analyze the degree of reliance on the promoter’s efforts.
See supra Part II.E.2 (discussing the requirements of each broad vertical commonality); supra
Part II.D (discussing the fourth element of Howey). The test simply acknowledges the
economic reality that some source of effort is required to increase the value of the
188
189
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all challenges considering the nature of financial products involving
investments.
The increased utility test shifts the focus from the relationship
between the promoter and the investor to the relationship between the
underlying product and the larger enterprise.197 This is logical given the
economic realities of investments: Investors are primarily concerned
with the value of the underlying product they are purchasing compared
to the potential for an increase in that product’s future value. Beyond
the impact an investment scheme may have on the underlying product’s
value, an investor would likely not be influenced by the structure so long
as the promise of returns is present. If the product incurs a new or
increased economic purpose when combined within a larger system, it
will satisfy the economic utility test and be classified as a common
enterprise.198 The relationship between the promoter and the investor
will not go unchecked as the fourth prong of Howey still mandates
investor reliance on the promoter.199 This eliminates any issues of
blending between the commonality element and the third party reliance
element.200
Take, for example, the orange groves involved in the Howey case.201
The average plot for sale consisted of parcels slightly larger than one acre
and each had approximately twenty to forty orange trees.202 Alone, this
small amount of acreage will have little to no economic value—aside
from the real estate value—to its owner because such a small number of
cultivated oranges will produce negligible profits once cultivation
expenses are deducted.203 In comparison, if the oranges from one small
parcel, and the expenses involved in cultivating it, are combined with
those of numerous, similarly situated owners, the owner of each small
parcel now has potential for realizing an increase in economic value.
The latter scenario creates a new economic purpose, which would be
investment and that, in the spirit of Howey, the effort should come from the promoter.
Howey, 328 U.S. at 300. To require otherwise would defeat the purpose of investing in an
investment scheme. See supra Part II.D (discussing the four requirements of the Howey test,
including an expectation of profits).
197
See supra Part II.E (outlining each of the three current commonality tests, including the
fact that each test frames its analysis in terms of the relationship between the promoter and
the investor).
198
See supra Part IV (laying forth the elements of the increased utility test).
199
See supra Part II.D (outlining the four elements of the Howey test).
200
See supra Part III.B (highlighting broad vertical commonality’s tendency to blend
together the third and fourth prongs of the Howey test).
201
Howey, 328 U.S. at 295.
202
Id.
203
Id. at 300. The Court recognized that “individual development of the plots of land
that are offered and sold would seldom be economically feasible due to their small size.”
Id.
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large scale production and supply distribution as opposed to the original
purpose of personal use and enjoyment. Due to the economies of scale
theory, the profits increase in relation to the number of owners involved
in the enterprise.204 Therefore, the scheme involved in Howey would be a
common enterprise under the increased utility test because the
underlying product—small parcels of orange producing land—gained a
new economic utility when combined with other similar parcels of
orange producing land.205
To further test the validity of the economic utility test, consider the
discretionary commodity derivative accounts involved in both Milnarik
v. M-S Commodities and SEC. v. Continental Commodities Corp.206 Both
cases involved promoters who used investor accounts to make trades in
Keeping in mind that the underlying
commodities futures.207
commodities do qualify as securities, the question arises whether the
agreements between the account holders and the promoters are
considered securities.208 Intuition would indicate that a discretionary
commodities account is not a security, and the increased utility test
would agree.209 The initial value of buying into a discretionary
commodity derivatives account is equal to the value after purchasing the

204
See FISHER, supra note 57, at 121 (providing the definition for the economies of scale
theory). Fisher states:
Economies of scale . . . refers to a decrease in average cost as the
quantity of output rises. . . . This concept of economies of scale is
sometimes referred to as the advantage of joint consumption:
individual consumers can reduce their costs by sharing the good and
its total cost with others.
Id. at 121–22.
205
Under the horizontal commonality test, the facts of Howey were considered a common
enterprise. See supra Part II.D (discussing the facts, holding, and reasoning of SEC. v.
Howey); supra Part II.E.1 (stating the horizontal commonality test). If the same facts were
analyzed under broad vertical commonality, it is likely that a common enterprise would be
found because the investor’s fortunes are tied directly with the efforts of the promoter. See
supra Part II.E.2 (presenting elements of broad vertical commonality). Also, because the
profits of the investor are tied to the fortunes of the promoter on a percentage basis, the
same facts would also qualify as a common enterprise under strict vertical commonality.
See supra Part II.E.3 (presenting the development of strict vertical commonality).
206
SEC v. Cont’l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 518–19 (5th Cir. 1974); Milnarik v. M-S
Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 275 (7th Cir. 1972).
207
See supra note 206 (noting the importance of Milnarik and Continental Commodities
Corp.).
208
See Cont’l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d at 520 n.9 (noting the importance of
distinguishing between the underlying commodity and the discretionary trading accounts
that deal in commodities).
209
See Milnarik, 457 F.2d at 277 (declaring that the discretionary account scheme at bar
resembled “an agency-for-hire rather than constituting the sale of a unit of a larger
enterprise” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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account.210 The economic realities that drive an increase in value for the
underlying commodities—and thus a profit for investors—are not the
true “efforts” of the promoter, but the market value of each commodity
in the portfolio. Thus, although an investor’s account value may
increase, it bears no relevance whether one investor’s account is part of a
larger whole. An independent discretionary commodity derivatives
account, holding the same commodities as one involved in a large
investment scheme, would see the same results simply due to market
fluctuations.211 Therefore, the increased utility test would hold that
discretionary commodity derivatives accounts are not securities.
Both above examples prove that the increased utility test conforms to
the intent of Howey and Congress. First, the test is flexible because it
allows courts to consider the individual facts of each case. Orange
groves and discretionary commodities accounts share no correlation, yet
the increased utility test apply to both and produce principled results.
Second, courts would not have to consider the different types of profit
sharing agreements or accounting techniques, which have been designed
to thwart current commonality tests.212 This allows the courts to focus on
the economic realities that affect and result from the financial product in
question as opposed to focusing on the form of each agreement.
Additionally, the increased utility test meets Congress’s intent because it
can be broadly used on a variety of investment schemes from the known,
such as discretionary commodity accounts and fractional agricultural
ownership, to the unknown types yet to be conceived by the
unscrupulous. Given its ability to handle innovative investment
schemes within the intent of both Howey and Congress, the increased
utility test is a more applicable test capable of producing consistent
results.
V. CONCLUSION
The current state of commonality jurisprudence is inconsistent and
in need of a fresh perspective.213 Circuits across the country have
differed as to which of the three commonality tests is more capable of
210
This is to be distinguished from the initial value of the commodities in the account
versus the future value of said commodities. Cont’l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d at 522.
211
This assumes the promoter makes identical portfolio choices for each account. See
Milnarik, 457 F.2d at 275 (involving an investment scheme that consisted of one promoter
making varying trades on separate and individual accounts).
212
See supra Part III.C (examining different investment schemes that keep investor
accounts separate so as to not trigger broad vertical commonality).
213
See supra Part II.F (noting the current disarray among the circuits regarding which
aspects of the three available commonality tests are best for evaluating an investment
contract).
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accurately assessing whether a financial product has the requisite
characteristics to be considered a common enterprise.214 Such a
disagreement among the circuits has and will continue to cause the same
investment scheme to be a security in one jurisdiction but not a security
in others.215 This problem runs absolutely counter to the very aims of
federal securities law.
Each commonality test is a product of creative legal thinking, but
that process has taken each test far away from the original analysis
principled in Howey. Each test is flawed: horizontal commonality is
overly restrictive; broad vertical commonality blends the third and
fourth prongs of the Howey test together; and strict vertical commonality
values form over substance.216 A new, economic-based, approach would
refocus the commonality analysis to the most important factors, which
are the economic realities. The proposed increased utility test does this
by shifting the focus from the relationship between investors and
promoters to the underlying reasons the investor initially placed his
money in an investment scheme. If the reasons were to increase the
economic purpose of the underlying product by incorporating it into a
large whole, then the overarching investment scheme is a common
enterprise. This analysis, coupled with the flexibility of the proposed
test, make it a viable solution to the current commonality conundrum.
Returning to the introductory hypothetical, Lucas subsequently
seeks counsel from an attorney in hopes that he can recover his
investment from the fraudulent Zibby Star Gazer promoters. The
attorney will inevitably encounter the Howey test and question whether
the investment scheme Lucas entered into was a common enterprise.217
If Lucas’s case is heard in a horizontal commonality jurisdiction, he will
not be able to recover because his success is not tied to the success of
other investors.218 If the jurisdiction follows strict vertical commonality,
See supra Part II.F (summarizing the circuit splits regarding commonality tests).
Compare Milnarik, 457 F.2d at 275 (holding that discretionary commodities accounts
were not securities), with Cont’l Commodities, 497 F.2d at 522 (holding the discretionary
commodities accounts were securities).
216
See supra Part III (criticizing each commonality test).
217
The attorney will conclude that Lucas’s investment meets the remaining three criteria:
He made an investment of money, with an expectation of profit, and relied on the efforts of
others. See supra Part II.D (outlining the four elements of Howey).
218
This is because the profits Lucas would receive are derived solely from the cultivation
and distribution of bulbs grown specifically in his parcel. See supra Part I (describing the
structure of the financial product involved). Recovery is based on the assumption that all
other elements necessary for recovery are met, such as 10b-5 fraud and an investment of
money with the expectation of profits derived from the efforts of a third party. See supra
Part II.D (discussing the remaining elements of Howey); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006)
(outlining the statutory requirements for establishing a securities fraud claim); 17 C.F.R.
214
215
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Lucas will also be unsuccessful in recovering because the promoter can
still reap profits from other successful parcels even though Lucas may
not see success in his own parcel. However, if Lucas is fortunate enough
to have his case heard in a jurisdiction that applies broad vertical
commonality, he will be able to recover because his fortunes are tied
directly to the efforts of the promoter. The federal securities laws did not
intend to let the fortunes of individual investors turn on the location of
their trial. If that were the intention, Congress would have left securities
regulation to the already established blue sky laws.219
Lucas would be better served if all jurisdictions followed the
increased utility test. Under this proposed test, Lucas would likely be
able to recover because the underlying product—the small parcel of land
where Zibby Star Gazer bulbs would be cultivated—would only gain a
new economic purpose if it were combined with those of similar
characteristics. When the small parcel is combined with a larger whole,
it shares in the benefits of economies of scale and thus Lucas would
receive profits derived therefrom. This economic purpose is in addition
to the independent value the bulbs would have if Lucas cultivated the
land himself and sold the bulbs at a local farmer’s market. Because
Lucas’s small parcel gains an additional economic purpose, separate
from any relationship between his failure and the success of the
promoter or other similarly situated investors, the investment scheme
Lucas invested in is a common enterprise, deserving of protection under
federal securities laws.220 This result seems more appropriate given

§ 240.10b-5 (2010) (promulgating the requirements one must satisfy to bring a securities
fraud claim). The requirements for a 10b-5 claim are:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
219
See LOSS & SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 18, at 11–12 (noting the state-bystate approach to securities regulation that produced inconsistent results depending on the
state in which a case was heard).
220
See supra note 175 (stating that this reasoning is consistent with the foundational
principle in Howey). In addition to being a common enterprise under the increased utility
test, Lucas made an investment of money with an expectation of profits derived from the
efforts of a third party. As such, his investment in the investment scheme meets the Howey
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Lucas is unlikely to be in a leveraged bargaining position to demand the
necessary information from the promoter he would need to discover that
Zibby Star Gazers are really man-made. The increased utility test would
allow Lucas to recoup his investment from the fraudulent investment
scheme and give him a second chance to use that money more wisely:
on next year’s gift for Mother’s Day.
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